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Introduction 
  State owned enterprise (SOE) reform is one of the biggest issues for every transition economy 
not only today but also in years to come. Even the Chinese economy, which is widely known as a 
successful case for “gradualist” economic transition, has been faced with poor management and low 
efficiency of many SOEs. Shock therapists have criticized the gradualist approach insisting that it is 
ineffective in totally reforming state sectors, but SOE reform is still persistent and intractable even 
for former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern European (CCE) countries which have 
followed their advice in the name of the “Washington consensus”. 
  As in the case for well known arguments on transition strategies, i.e. gradualism vs. shock 
therapy, there has been a heated debate centering on the effectiveness of privatization of state 
enterprises. Conventional wisdom is that if an economy is to be marketized, its property rights 
should be privately owned. Now that transition economies want to transform themselves from plan 
to market, they must change  their ownership structure, too, from public to privately owned. 
Generally, shock therapists support this view strongly, while gradualists do not. In light of “China’s 
Rise and Russia’s Fall”
1, however, the recent view generally tends to be favorable for the gradualist 
approach with regard to SOE property reform. It is often said that ownership of property rights does 
not matter. 
   In this paper we examine several issues on privatization, particularly of state enterprises, which 
have long dominated socialist economies. Is privatization useful and necessary for transition 
economies? If so, in what sense and in what way? How is it linked with market development and 
institutional evolution of those economies? What are the characteristics of privatization in China, 
which has been reluctant to changing property rights of their state enterprises?   
  This paper is organized as follows. First we briefly review China’s SOEs and their performance 
to understand the background behind their relative shrinkage in the national economy (section 1). 
Then we look at the arguments regarding how to reform these enterprises, making some comments   2
on the three different views of their reform (section 2). Then we take up a theoretical issue on the 
necessity of privatization in transition (section 3). After that, we discuss an empirical issue on the 
effectiveness of privatization (section 4). Finally, we focus on  the recent privatization drive in China 
and its characteristics compared to FSU and CEE nations (section 5). 
 
1. State owned enterprises and their performance in China 
.  Many indicators demonstrate how China’s SOEs are inefficient in management and how their 
profitability is deteriorating at least until 1998. The share of SOEs in deficit is said to be above 43 %, 
and might probably be higher than 75 % in reality if hidden and repressed deficits were included. 
The ratio of their total deficits and profits has been rising in trend in the 1990’s, when the average 
rate of profits has declined to almost none. 




  On the other hand, non-public sectors, particularly private and foreign ones, have been growing 
so rapidly adapting themselves very well to emerging markets that they have now become 
characterized the Chinese  “socialism” as a backbone of its economy.  The table shows quite 
clearly how private and other non-public enterprises have flourished in the Chinese scene, 
particularly in the 1990’s. 
Table 1 also tells us that the SOE’s industrial output has declined in relative terms, while their 
investment share does not change very much. This implies that their investment efficiency has 
been deteriorating. There are many indicators that show their relative inefficiency. Let us compare 
their industrial profitability and efficiency vis -à-vis  non-state sectors, based on China’s industrial 
censuses for 1985 and 1995 (see Table 2). Obviously, SOE’s profitability measured as a ratio of 
profits plus taxes to revenues and their efficiency measured as labor productivity are lower than 
those of their non-state counterparts. The table demonstrates, too, that state enterprises distribute 
relatively more to their workers and employees. 
 
(insert Table 2 here) 
 
This table only depicts the average difference in performance between SOEs and the others.   3
Performance, however, varies not only with ownership types but also with other various factors, such 
as size, capital/labor ratio, type of industry, age, employees’ educational levels etc. of enterprises. 
Once we control for the other factors than ownership, can we arrive at the same conclusion as 
above? Liu testifies to the higher efficiency of private firms than state enterprises, based on 1995 
census firm level data for steel industry alone and through several regression analyses. His findings 
are: 1) property right reform is effective in raising productivity, 2)an increase in private capital 
among non-state shares contributes to productivity to a great extent, 3)property right reform in large 
enterprises as well as small and medium -sized ones is conducive to productivity grow th.
2                                  
 
What makes state enterprises generally so inefficient, then? The following reasons, which can be 
applied almost equally to any transition economies, but in a context of China’s economic reforms are 
often referred to as: 
1) Government interventions or lack of enterprises’ autonomy. It is a well-known fact that they 
are still lacking in management autonomy that must have been assured formally by several 
related laws. As they are state owned, it is easier for the state to control their management, 
directly or indirectly, and whether they are formally stock companies or not.  
2) The so-called “soft budget constraint”, i.e. paternalism and protectionism  made by their 
supervising governments which shoulder any failures  resulted from SOEs ’  mismanagement 
on their behalf. Under this principle, no state enterprise, particularly of relatively large size, 
would  be allowed to go in bankruptcy, even if they run long in deficit.  
3) Various “historical legacies” and social burdens borne by these enterprises.  State firms, for 
instance, have provided medical cares for their employees. Pensions for the retired employees 
are a matter of their enterprises. Moreover, excessive employment characterizes SOEs as an 
important measure for social security. Their workers and employees can not be dismissed by 
the state
3. 
4) Low quality of enterprise managers, who are less adaptive to changing market environment 
than those in the non-state sector. They are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats 
at any rate. They are appointed by the government not according to their business ability, but 
based on their rankings  in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Even managers of share-holding 
companies  (and surprisingly enough, even the top leadership of a collective enterprise, too) 
are in fact appointed and/or approved by its supervising administrative apparatus (see Table 3). 
This fact illustrates how an enterprise loses the basic managerial independence. It is Ryutaro   4
Komiya who asserted in the late 1980’s that there existed 
no enterprise in China at all
4. No doubt, his assertion appears to be an overstatement at first sight 
today, but many SOEs are still not the enterprises in that they cannot enjoy full freedom from a 
variety of fetters made by the state. It goes without saying that the Chinese leadership has not sit  
by and watched those firms shrinking in the market. Various policies to save and reform them 
have been launched: Corporation law was enacted, stock markets were opened, and financial aids 
to settle their bad performing loans were provided. Several types of SOE restructuring programs 
were tried to give them incentives. Contract system that was applied quite widely in the late 
1980’s is such an example. However, the leadership has found that their efforts to renovate SOEs 
and prevent them from losing their   
 
(insert Table 3 here) 
 
shares further in the market has turned out to be ineffective. SOEs’ financial difficulties have 
become aggravated. Millions of their workers were laid off.  Even under these circumstances, the 
Chinese government has strongly and officially refused to implement a broad range of privatization 
policies, though “de facto privatization” has proceeded as described below. A term of privatization is 
still in the taboo within the Chinese officialdom. They still adhere to a long held principle of “public 
ownership as basis”. China’s ideological antagonism against a concept of “privatization” is fairly 
strong. Its new strategy adopted since 1997 is called “zhuada fangxiao (retain the large, release the 
small)”. It is a policy to compromise their theory with practice, because large and important state 
enterprises can be retained as their economy ’s “commanding heights”, while small ones are allowed 
to be privatized. 
This is one of the characteristi cs that set China’s SOE reform away from that FSU and CEE’s 
transition  process, where large scale privatization has been planned and implemented as an 
indispensable part of their economic reform (see Table 4below). The table demonstrates that the 
more successful a country is in transition, the more widely it is privatized, though definition of 
privatization remains to be open to question. In other words, privatization has been deeply 
incorporated in their economic transition process. In contrast to China,  FSU and CEE countries 
have already  abandoned the socialist principle as well as ideological antagonism against 
privatization as a result of political democracy. We will observe later how effective such 
privatization at enterprise level is in those countries.                           5
Another feature of China’s SOE reform is that it is less institutionalized and the property rights are 
more vague compared to European transition countries. Township and village enterprises (TVEs), 
which have been highly praised as a symbol of economic development in China, are characterized by 
their vaguely defined property rights. Some authors like Weitzman=Xu and Tian try to seek certain 
rationality in such an ambiguous property system, though it looks irrational at first sight
5.   
It is undeniable that China’s public firms have been gradually eroded by incessant waves of “de 
facto privatization” under the circumstances  of less institutionalized and more vague ownership. a) 
Many public firms, TVEs in particular, are private in reality, though nominally in public ownership, 
since they know very well that they can acquire a necessary amount of loans from state banks more 
easily under the guise of public ownership. Moreover, b) fairly many state enterprise, let alone 
collectives, are actually managed in an autocratic way by the managers or their group as if their 
assets are really in private hands. It is reported that a tremendous amount of public assets are 
“washed away” to invisible hands in China today. This kind of situations has greatly given rise to a 
dynamic force to accelerate market development so far, but with increasing negative effects on the 
Chinese economy as a whole.   
  
(insert Table 4 here) 
 
2. SOE Reform Strategies: Three Views 
  The issue of SOE reforms in China has not only been argued by the Chinese in a very heated 
way, but has attracted  worldwide attention among many China  watchers as well. In the academic 
world of economists in China, there are basically two streams of thought with regard to state 
enterprises and their reform.  One is the “market school” typified by Lin, who insists as follows. If 
only their historical burdens of social security as described above are removed, their budget is 
hardened, and most importantly, well-functioning markets of commodities,  capital, and even 
managers are provided, then they can operate as efficiently with better governance as private firms 
can do
6. 
  The other school is one that can be  labeled as “property right school”, which places heavier 
emphasis on proprietorship, particularly ownership of enterprises. This school contends that unless 
SOEs are privatized they would not essentially be able to improve their management, since the 
efficient corporate governance can not be guaranteed. According to Weiying Zhang, the state 
ownership system can produce no true capitalist or manager, even if these enterprises are   6
transformed into joint-stock companies.  They would still encounter various sorts of state 
intervention, as it is the single or major shareholder. There must be owners who are the residual 
claimants to their enterprise’s profits. Moreover, even if ordinary state firms happened to be 
privatized, they would still be controlled by the  state that controls the entire financial channels, 
which are almost state owned. He goes on to recommend, then, that both financial and non-financial 
state enterprises be privatized at the same time
7.    
  These two schools just reflect the two different view on efficient governance structure in 
modern enterprises, but against the background that both private and individual enterprises have 
grown rapidly, it seems that the property right school is now gathering momentum by degrees within 
the  Chinese academic circle. In Chinese as well as in Japanese, a term  “privatization” can be 
translated in two different ways: one is “mingyinghua (management by private persons), the other is 
“siyouhua” (ownership by private hands). A term siyouhua is still a taboo in the Chinese political 
culture today, so that Zhang intentionally avoids the use of such terminology, to make his argument 
politically safe and acceptable in China. 
  Beside these two schools, there is another view on China’s SOE reform. Steinfeld points out 
through his studies on China’s steel industry that property right reform would function only w hen 
institutions protecting the property are firmly established in the real scene
8.  But, he continues, in 
China as well as in other transition economies, where such institutions are either lacking or 
underdeveloped,  property rights are too difficult to reform. He concludes, then, that rather than 
reforming the ownership structure is a policy to make constraints on state enterprises harder more 
necessary in order to operate them well. Although his emphasis is placed on an aspect of 
institutionalization or institutional development, his recommendation resembles more or less that of 
the  “market school” above. In the same vein, in line with the market school he asserts that 
privatization in FSU and CEE countries has turned out to be totally a “failure” followed  by much of 
turmoil and disorder in the economies. 
  The same sort of view is shared by Jefferson, Rawski, and others to a certain extent, who argue 
that there arose such a mechanism in China that they call “endogenous reform”: new institutions 
have been generated endogenously once markets were brought in
9. With regard to SOE reforms, they 
stress the importance of market, saying that what is required for China now is not property right 
change but further development of markets. This hypothesis seems to imply that once a market 
mechanism starts to function, it will naturally create necessary institutions, including property rights, 
associated with the market.    7
Jefferson, in particular, defends China’s state enterprises. In his view, declining profitability of 
those enterprises stems from  increasingly keen competition with non-state enterprises, such as 
burgeoning TVEs , foreign and private ones. According to his analysis, SOE’s productivity is high 
enough, though declining over time as are other sectors.  Controlling for various factors and 
estimating the pure ownership effect, he concludes that China’s rural enterprises do not necessarily 
outpace SOEs in productivity unlike the popular view
10.      
  Let us ask, however, are marketization, privatization, and institutionalization substitutes or 
complementary with each other in the process of economic transition? As the modern history 
demonstrates, generally these three factors are closely interacted (see Figure 1). For instance, private 
ownership must be effective in order to develop various  institutions, since it requires legal 
institutions in order to clarify and protect the ownership as well as related rights and duties. 
Conversely, development of such institutions, say establishment of legal ownership rights a nd 
mechanisms to enforce these rights,  would promote private proprietorship  much further.   
 
(insert Figure 1 here)  
 
  By the same token, privatization would be definitely efficient to promote the development of 
markets, since it is easier to clarify the owner than any other types of property rights. Developing 
markets, on the other hand, would strengthen the sense of self-interests of private owners. In addition, 
the further markets develop, the more market-related institutions are required. As the property rights 
are established, contracts can be implemented to reduce transaction costs, which in turn facilitates 
market development, as North has suggested
11. Thus, the above three factors are  interrelated so 
much that both institutional development and private ownership are necessary for well-functioning 
markets.   
  The question, then, is sequencing and relative causality among these three factors. They 
probably could not occur at the same time, interact to the same degree, and proceed hand in hand. 
We believe, however, that if privatization encourages market development, and if institutionalization 
promotes privatization as well as markets, then it seems natural to assume that privatization would  
be capable to strengthen further development of various institutions. Moreover, if transition costs 
have to be reduced in the real process, such a causal chain would be realized as marketization needs 
institutions, which in turn advance privatization, with the result that markets can develop further . 
The process of China’s market development and privatization appears to have been following just   8
such sequences, as Jefferson and others insist. The remaining question is, then, how to accelerate this 
interactive process. 
  State enterprises must be reformed, by way of privatization or not, but there can be several paths 
(strategies) for China to follow (see Figure 2)
12. The first one is a path, which is officially deemed 
most ideal for China (path A). Namely, public ownership is maintained but the market is developed. 
The second one is a path, which Jefferson and others think is most rational for and fitting well China 
(path B). Along this path, market development is pursued in the earlier stages, but  later and 
gradually public property is transformed into private one. The third one is a path, which Zhang 
considers is the best for China (path C). That is to say, property rights should be revised from the 
beginning in keeping with market development. Privatization of state enterprise is naturally 
recommended as an important step. Finally, there is a path that the so-called shock therapists believe 
should universally be applied to any transition economy (path D) . Public enterprises must primarily 
be privatized in order to develop markets. They insist that privatization as well a s deregulation 
would be able to create a spontaneous and dynamic market mechanism.   
  
(insert Figure 2 here)    
  
 Related with a sequencing problem, thus, is a theoretical issue on the time horizon: perspectives 
can be different between the short-run and the long-run. More specifically, we believe that hasty 
privatization of state enterprises may be unnecessary in the short-run, but privatization itself must be 
indispensable in the long run in order to acquire the more appropriate corporate governance for those 
enterprises. Our understanding is that Jefferson and other  “gradualists”, probably Steinfeld, too, 
realize the necessity of privatizing most of state enterprises in the final analysis (see Figure 2 again). 
In this sense, their strategy of reforming Chinese state enterprises  is not so different from that of 
the property right school as it would appear, though the paths on the way to the final goal are 
different.   
 Unlike Lin, Steinfeld, and Jefferson, we believe that ownership matters even in the case for 
China. Their views cannot explain very well a widespread privatization drive in the recent years in 
China. Certainly, privatization is not a panacea. It is true that even though state firms are privatized, 
they would not necessarily improve their management immediately and dramatically. But provided 
that, while privatizing SOEs, many restrictions constraining private enterprises (say entry restriction) 
were removed, the social security system like unemployment insurance were made more available,   9
and  complementary institutions protecting private property were set in motion, then  their 
management efficiency could rise higher at least compared to a situation prior to the privatization. 
This statement is supported by  theoretical and empirical considerations, both of which are subjects 
to consider in what follows. 
 
3. Benefits and costs of privatization: economics of privatization 
   In the recent twenty years,  worldwide privatization has been undergoing not only in transition 
economies but in other developed and developing countries. One of the reasons why public 
enterprises are sold out is that the fiscal deficits are aggravating in these countries. Thus buy-outs of 
such enterprises can fill deficits, though temporarily and to a limited extent.  But the m ore 
important reason lies in the fact that most of these enterprises are so poorly managed that a huge 
amount of deficits are piled up every year which are finally filled by government subsidies. A typical 
example is the Japanese National Railway before privatization.   
  Why, then, are privatized firms expected to be more efficient in management?  More precisely, 
why are public enterprises less efficient than private ones, other things being equal?  What are main 
theoretical reasons for privatization, both in micro- and in macro-economic terms?  How should the 
privatizing of public firms be evaluated?  Let us comment on several theoretical aspects of 
“economics of privatization”. 
(1)  Privatization without definite institutions is certainly risky as Steinfeld insists. Undeniably, if 
state enterprises were privatized without associated institutions such as relevant laws and 
regulations, then their managers would literally “privatize” their own enterprises,  whether in 
secret or openly, as pointed out above regarding de facto privatization. However, it seems to be 
out of mark that privatization is impossible without well-prepared institutions as he emphasizes. 
When one looks at a general process of market development, one would find that they can not 
function properly without certain rules and regulations, but it is not after those institutions 
developed that markets were created or  regenerated in China. More desirably, both legal 
institutions, formal or informal, and private property rights can develop interactively,  as is 
indicated by Figure 1. 
(2)  Corporate governance of enterprises varies with their size. In large firms management must be 
separated from ownership while in small ones owners are often managers at the same time. 
Therefore, it is usually said, if only given full managerial autonomy and competitive market, 
any large enterprises can be efficient in their management, irrespective of ownership type, i.e.   10
whether they are privately or state owned.   However, remember that compared to private firms 
state enterprises are more likely to be subject to certain state interventions whereas they can 
enjoy its protections, e.g. appointment of managers, basic decisions of investment, provisions of 
loans etc. Furthermore, it is much easier for private firms to clarify the property rights than for 
public enterprises. The most ambiguous ownership is that by “the whole people”, namely state 
ownership.  Property owned by the whole people is almost equivalent to free goods, since 
nobody owns it. No one would be responsible for such property. Therefore, the  managerial 
efficiency of state enterprises is,  ceteris paribus, lower than, or at best equal to, that of their 
private counterparts.  Let managerial efficiency of an enterprise be E, which is a function of 
property rights, scale,  capital intensity, market conditions, type of products and services 
produced, and so on. Then, it seems natural to assume, 
      E( p, fi) < E( s, fi) , 
       =   
   given fi, where suffixes p and s indicate private and state  ownership, respectively,   
   and fi represents other factors. 
     In other words, there is no theoretical reason that suppose that state enterprises,                              
other things being equal, can be more efficient in management with more  effective       
governance than their private counterparts. Compare two ownership types, private and public. 
Private ownership is definitely easier to impose a governance structure that managers pursue the 
maximization of share value as their primary objective. Neither the market school n or the 
institution school has ever pointed out theoretical advantage of state enterprises in governance.  
  Consider, why are state enterprises often subject to various sorts of state interventions, and 
why is it very hard for them to realize complete separation of management from ownership in 
these enterprises (zhengqi fenkai), though its necessity has repeatedly been called for since the 
1980’s. One reason is that in Chinese state enterprises, particularly of large size, their top 
leadership is controlled by the communist party. Another reason is that they are state owned, 
more likely to be interfered by the owner, i.e. the state, than their private counterparts. It is true 
that private companies, too, have been faced with state interventions, or even worse, 
discriminations in China. Thus privatization is not a guarantee for enterprises to enjoy full 
independence from state  interference. Yet, it can be a step toward more autonomous 
management. Private firms can be more independent from the state than SOEs, or at the least, 
could be interfered by the state to the same extent as their state counterparts are.   11
(3)  Consequently, state firms suffers, almost necessarily, the “opportunity loss”, or the loss that 
could have been avoided under the private property system. Let M be a curve of marginal 
productivity of capital. Generally, E(p) > E(s) as Table 2 suggests. Hence, marginal productivity 
of private capital M(p) is higher than that of state capital M(s), holding other things constant 
(see Figure 3).
13 The opportunity loss can be measured, for instance, by an area of K 0*{ M(s)- 
M(p)}.
14 Of course, there would be no such loss if the two types of enterprises are managed 
with an equal level of efficiency, M(s)=M(p), which is the extreme case. If both M and K can 
change with time, moreover the gap between M(s) and M(p) is widened as is usually supposed 
and SOE investment (increase in K) continues, then the total opportunity loss in the long run 
will be:  ￿t K t{ Mt(s)- Mt(p)} . 
 
   (insert Figure 3 here) 
 
(4)  Thus we may conclude that unless SOEs can produce certain benefits more than the opportunity 
loss, there would be no economic raison d’être  to maintain them, so far as economic benefits at 
firm level is concerned. No doubt, there can be a situation that privatization is not a good choice 
in the macroeconomic sense for a national economy, while it has to be pursued in the 
microeconomic sense.   
(5)  One remark should be added to the nature of loss incurred by state enterprises. As pointed out 
above, China’s state enterprises have been faced with growing deficits. Non-state enterprises are 
not free from managerial loss, either, which sometimes outpaces that of state enterprises. But the 
nature of such managerial loss is essentially different between these two types of enterprises. 
SOE managers do not take responsibility for deficits that occurred, while managers of non-state 
enterprises have to do.   
(6)  So far we have ignored the privatization or “transformational” costs. It is generally recognized, 
for instance, that SOE privatization would necessarily bring about a serious unemployment 
problem (since they are holding massive surplus labor), which may cause an awful social unrest. 
This is one of the strong arguments against overall privatization, or just the reason that the 
Chinese leadership stick to the state or public ownership principle, beside for the ideological 
reason. But does privatization necessarily lead to an increase in unemployment and lay-off?  
This is far from clear, and not always supported empirically as stated below. What is more, SOE 
privatization may create more employment in the long run, as it facilitates restructuring of the   12
entire economy. 
(7)  Then, if the transformational costs associated with privatization were  lower than the opportunity 
loss, particularly in the long r un, privatization would produce net social welfare under the 
assumptions as above. Conversely, if such transformational  costs were  higher than the 
opportunity loss, there would be no benefit to privatize state enterprises in terms of the macro 
economy, even if their managerial efficiency improved.    
    
4. Effects of privatization: empirical evidence  
    Before moving to empirical studies on privatization, it seems worthy of  distinguishing two 
levels of privatization. Privatization itself is a process whereby public firms are “privatized” in the 
sense that all or part of their shares are transferred to private persons or non-public organizations. It 
means a change in ownership structure at firm level. On the other hand, such a situation can be often 
called privatization, too, as the macroeconomic share of public firms declines over time, whether 
public firms are privatized in the above sense or not. Let us call the former type of  privatization as 
“micro privatization”, and the latter type as “macro privatization”.  
   Enterprises in transition economies can be classified broadly into the following three categories: 
public or state enterprises, (de novo) non-public or non-state enterprises, and privatized enterprises 
which were formerly public enterprises. How can a privatized enterprise perform well in practice 
either in the macro or in the micro economic sense?  Does micro privatization always have to bear 
social costs like increasing unemployment or lay-off? These questions deserve to be asked, but have 
not been fully answered so far. Now, let us turn to these empirical issue of privatization. 
    It is well known that there has long been a debate in the West about  relationship between 
enterprise performance and its ownership pattern. As for the  practical e ffects of privatization, a 
general  consensus has not been reached. But it seems that the recent studies are more or less 
favorable for privatization. Megginson and others, for instance, compared the pre- and 
post-privatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries. They 
conclude that after being privatized, firms were able to increase sales, profits, capital investment, and 
even their work forces
15.   
    So far as privatization effects in transition economies are concerned, empirical studies and 
surveys with a focus on CEE and CIS countries are being accumulated. Carlin makes a good 
summary of and main results from such studies
16. Let us review very briefly some of these studies 
and findings.   13
    Frydman and others found that private ownership, except for worker ownership, dramatically 
improved corporate performance
17. They also revealed that privatized firms generated significant 
employment gains relative to state firms, contrary to  conventional wisdom. 
    Pohl and others made a comprehensive research on 6,300 industrial firms in seven countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and reached the following conclusions: privatized firms were able to 
gain productivity growth as much as three to five times higher than state firms; privatization 
methods, say  buying-out to employees or mass privatization, did not affect the difference in 
productivity
18. 
     Based on a series of data sets collected by the World Bank, Estrin and others made a 
comparative analysis on enterprise behavior and performance of Polish and Russian firms, finding 
out some important facts
19. For example, in Poland in 1993, privatized firms did not appear to be 
restructuring significantly more than SOEs, though de novo firms were performing much better. As 
far as output growth, employment growth and excess employment are concerned there was no 
significant difference in performance between privatized and state owned enterprises. The most 
striking feature of the results for both Poland and Russia was the failure of outsider-owned firms to 
restructure more than SOEs. Their findings, however, are derived from the data for early days in the 
privatization process. 
    Estrin and Rosevear used an enterprise level random survey of 150 firms in Ukraine and tested 
whether privatization had yielded improved firm performance and whether specific ownership forms 
had led to different behavior at the enterprise level
20. The results of their analysis are: the hypothesis 
that private ownership per se is associated with improved performance was refuted. But they found 
barter to be associated with lower profitability, and to be less common in privatized firms.   
Case 5. Six Newly Independent States 
    Djankov investigated a relationship between ownership structure and enterprise performance in 
the NIS, using detailed survey data collected by the World Bank in 1997 and 1998
21. He tested a 
non-linear analysis and concluded that some significant relationships existed between different types 
of ownership and enterprise restructuring. These findings ar e, he stressed, consistent with some of 
the theoretical models of  corporate governance in mature economies.   
   Finally, let us add Grosfeld and Nivet’s findings to the above list of case studies. They found that 
large Polish firms demonstrated a clear difference in  behavior between state and privatized 
enterprises: investment ratio of 85 SOEs is 4.8 % while that of 27 privatized firms is 11.2 %. Namely, 
privatized firms are more active in investment and therefore  future growth. Moreover, their growth   14
performance is not only  stronger but also the growth of their output is much less influenced by 
sectoral output growth than is the case for SOEs
22.   
   Do the same conclusions hold for the case of China? To the best of our knowledge, there is still 
no systematic, empirical, and  comparative study, at least comparable with the above studies, on 
China’s privatization and its effects on enterprise performance
23. However, there is sufficient 
evidence, albeit indirect and weak, that privatization would improve enterprise efficiency and/or 
profitability. For example, let us see a relationship between in-debt enterprise ratio and SOE ratio 
calculated at the industry level (Figure 4). It shows that the higher SOE’s share is associated with the 
higher percentage of enterprises in debt.  
   In addition, we have several studies on performance of companies listed on the stock markets in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai. Xu, for instance, arrives at a conclusion that the higher share by the state 
generally produces the worse performance in those companies, while the higher concentration of 
shares has the same effect
24.  Chen and Jiang, on the other hand, who apply the similar sort of 
regression analyses to the data of electronics, commerce and public utilities of such listed firms, find 
that it is only in electronics industry, which is involved in highly competitive market, that the state 
share has a negative impact on enterprise performance
25.  Our own findings based on same sort of 
data of companies on Shenzhen stock market are as follows (see Table 5):   
(1)  As Chen and Jiang note, state share’s impact on enterprise performance vary with industry, but 
unlike their conclusions, it is typically public utilities that the state share ratio has a negative 
effect on profitability of enterprises concerned. In the case of medicine industry, which is in 
quite competitive market, that share has even a positive effect on profitability. 
(2)  Contrary to our expectation, the proportion of unlisted (listed) shares is not negatively 
(positively) correlated with profitability. This fact seems to imply that insiders basically control 
the companies in question. 
(3)  Unlike Xiao’s conclusion, it does not seem to hold that the more concentrated a company’s share, 
the more profitable it is.  
   
   (insert Table 5 here) 
 
    Nevertheless, these findings on listed companies are subject to several limits. First of all, the 
data are confined to those of listed companies on Shenzhen stock market. Second, profitability is 
measured by profit/revenue ratios, which can be statistically weak. Third, our findings are derived   15
from simple correlation analysis, not controlling for many other factors such as scale, age, capital 
intensity, etc. 
 More importantly, such a type of analysis as on listed companies does not strongly demonstrate 
that privatization of SOEs has definitely a positive effect on enterprise performance, partly because 
the proportion of state ownership cannot necessarily be a good indicator of privatization. Compare a 
company A with 90 % of state share with a company B with 60 % of cooperate share. If the firms 
with company B’s biggest share are all state owned, then there would be no substantial difference 
between these two companies in nature of ownership. Moreover, share holding itself does not still 
guarantee good corporate governance in China today, where stockholders’ meeting does not appear 
to be working well.   
   To summarize. Given the so-called selection bias
26, experiences of privatization in some 
European transition economies indicate that the results are certainly mixed, but roughly speaking, 
privatizing state enterprises is (a) generally conducive to the improvement of managerial 
performance in former state enterprises in relatively advanced countries like Poland, Hungary and 
Czech, while its effects on enterprise performance is not very significant in stagnant economies such 
as Russia and Ukraine. This finding requires some revision of both Lin’s and Stainfeld’s 
observations that post-socialist privatization is nothing but a failure. We have to distinguish 
successful and unsuccessful cases of privatization, and to ask why such a different result happens. 
Based on rich and coherent analyses of privatization experiences in former socialist countries, 
Frydman and Rapaczynski  concluded, “unless closure is seriously contemplated, privatization is 
unlikely to be of much help”. Given most state enterprises as “a set of white elephants in the middle 
of nowhere----with low quality of capital stock and an organizational structure  incapable of 
functioning in a normal economic environment” privatization may produce nothing only by itself
27. 
(b) It is particularly effective for medium and small-sized firms, but even for large-sized ones to a 
lesser extent
28. Moreover, (c) De novo private firms perform best, and (d)there are several styles of 
privatization, such as managerial, employees’ and foreign capital’s buy-outs, but it is still uncertain 
which style, except for foreign-owned, is most effective as privatized ownership.  
    Studies on CEE transition economies also give us a good lesson of privatization effects on 
employment. Micro privatization itself may not necessarily be ineffective in securing jobs of the 
employees. Most of state enterprises are characterized by excessive employment, thus once 
restructured and privatized they would fire or lay-off the redundant labor within SOEs who have 
been hired under the socialist principle of “full employment”. However, micro privatization is   16
different from macro privatization. Part of the surplus labor which is released out of SOEs as a result 
of privatization may be absorbed by newly set up private firms, created during the privatization and 
its associated restructuring process. More concretely, privatization plus market development could 
offer more job opportunities for workers within state enterprises, whose marginal productivity is 
lower than their wage.  If so, the transformational costs associated with privatization could be lower 
in the macro economic context, at least in the relatively long run, than we have imagined.   
  Thus, privatization must be evaluated from a point of view of its total effects on the entire 
economy. Social costs of micro privatization, for example,  must be judged not only in relation to its 
effects on increased unemployment and lay-off but also from other aspects: macro economic benefits 
and costs, e.g. increases in tax revenues, employment and wages, savings, foreign trade and FDI, etc. 
Using data for 218 non-financial privatization cases that took place in Mexico, La Porta and 
Lopez-de-Silanes draw an interesting conclusion as follows:   
  “The additional revenue received by the government as a result of the privatization was 
probably large enough to –at least in principle—offset society’s cost of job losses.  ---- The 
additional revenues that resulted from privatization would have been enough to give N$659,454 
(US$212,727) to each of the 550 laid -off workers from the average firm—a very large sum given 
that the annual pre-privatization income of an average SOE worker is N$14,880 (US$4,800)”.
29   
Finally, we should take it into consideration that privatization in former socialist economies is 
substantially different from that in other countries, developed or developing. It involves two 
objectives, Frydman and Rapaczynski say: depoliticization and creation of a new institutional 
structure of  corporate governance
30. Brada, too, states that it was necessary for former socialist 
economies in order to establish democracy and to destroy the existing basis  of the Party’s 
monopoly over the political power, i.e. SOEs
31. It must have been a necessary process for 
depoliticizing FSU and CEE economies which has long been under the political tight control by the 
communist party. Privatization as well as the entire transition policy, then, should be, or must be, 
evaluated in a wider context than strictly economic effects, including its social and political impacts 
on the society as a whole. 
 
5. Privatization in China and its characteristics 
    Since the early 1980’s macro privatization has been proceeding, first hesitantly, then boldly in 
China. This can be shown by a rising trend of private sector’s share in Table1. In 1999 when China’s 
new constitution was adopted, private sectors were formally admitted as “indispensable part of the   17
national economy ”. Formerly, they had been held in contempt as “socially ostracized”, or “tails of 
capitalism”. Once they were permitted, they began to burgeon forth. 
  The speed of micro privatization in China, nevertheless, is much lower, at least until recently 
than its European counterparts (compare Table 1 and 2). But from 1998 on, various types of property 
reforms have been applied to SOEs in China.  According to a survey conducted by the State 
Statistical Bureau in 1998, among 13,726 enterprises that had been “restructured”, as many as 76 % 
of them had undergone privatization in the sense of buyout of state capital, whether all or partial. 
Micro privatization proceeded quite rapidly particularly in Sichuan and Shandong provinces. 
According to Yang, a drive of reforming property right of small and county level state enterprises 
took place in Sichuan province in the early 1990’s. As of the end of October 1998, 81.74 % of small 
firms at city and county levels underwent various forms of property reforms. As a result, he says, a 
majority of these post-reform f irms began to perform well, changing their output structure,   
decreasing their debt/asset ratio, increasing employees’ earnings, and raising tax revenues for the 
state
32. The case of property right reform in Zhucheng of Shandong is well known as a “Zhucheng 
model”, which transformed state property into employees’ collective assets with the result that 
higher productivity was reportedly achieved. 
What, then, characterizes China’s privatization vis-à-vis the cases for FSU and CCE countries? 
First, it is almost confined to small and medium-size enterprises, as led by the above-mentioned 
official policy of zhuada fangxiao. In European former socialist countries, overall privatization has 
been carried out involving large-sized state enterprises. But in China, property rights at least of the 
strategically important sectors are firmly kept in the state hands, even though their relative share in 
output and employment  continues to decline (see Table 1). Commercialization, instead, rather than 
privatization is now on the agenda of large SOE reform. Many large sized state enterprises are 
becoming stock companies, part of whose stocks are on the market, as referred to above. 
 Second, macro privatization has been more in progress than micro privatization, against the 
backg round of market development and the gradualist approach China has adopted. Numerous 
non-public firms have  mushroomed, though some disappeared immediately through the hard 
competition in the market, but this allowed these enterprises to outperform state ones in both 
efficiency and profitability. Micro privatization or property right transformation, on the other hand, 
is more difficult than macro one, since it needs a fundamental institutional change of public 
enterprises.   
 Third, political dictatorship is still held by the Party in the privatization process in China. That is   18
to say, no depoliticization has been kept on in the privatization drive. Establishment of the party 
organizations have been called for even within foreign funded enterprises. Even though state assets 
are gradually transferred from the state to private hands, the political structure within enterprises 
concerned still remains the same. In China, where the party still has a strong say in basic decisions in 
every corner of social life, depoliticization can not be an aim to reform SOEs. However, China’s 
reality is  that “de facto depoliticization” is likely to be going on notwithstanding the leadership’s will 
and often-launched political campaigns. 
Fourth, de facto privatization is far ahead of de jure and formal privatization. As we discussed 
above, SOE reform has been carries out in China without much development of associated 
institutions. Ambiguity, let alone proprietorship, is one of the important features of the entire 
transition process in China. So far it is a source of dynamic which pushes forward market evolution 
and creation of new entrepreneurs. But in our view, it has become an obstacle to further transition of 
the economic system. De facto privatization itself, too, has two sides: both advantage and 
disadvantage. It seems to us that its disadvantage has now outweighed the advantage, as exemplified 
by rampant corruption and raging literal “privatization” of public assets by managers.   
The overall trend of privatization, even though still limited to small and medium -sized enterprises, 
would  probably also affect the large firms at any rate, whether one likes it or not. In other words, 
macro privatization would accelerate micro privatization. Accordingly, market development widens 
the area of private proprietorship, as suggested by Figure 1. But the point is that market can not, or 
takes time to, create new institutions by itself. Laws, regulations, rules and norms to protect property 
rights, for example, should be basically provided as public goods by the state. Changing property 
structure as well as clarifying property rights is certainly a tough task, for socialist economies with a 
lot of people of vested interests in public property, in particular. We may be allowed to say, however, 
that, first, clearly defined property rights are better than vaguely defined rights, second, formal 
privatization is at least better than informal, spontaneous, and de facto privatization in promoting 
transition process. The recent trend of privatization, difficulties both state and rural enterprises 
encounter, and various experiments of enterprise reforms (gaizhi) in China seem to support these our 
views, directly or indirectly.           
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Table 1  Shares of State and Non-public Sectors (%)
State Sector Non-public Sector
Gross Industrial  Fixed Capital Urban Gross Industrial Urban
    Output   Investment Employment     Output Employment
1978 77.6 78.3 0.2
1980 76.0 81.9 76.2 0.5 0.8
1985 64.9 66.1 70.2 3.1 3.9
1990 54.6 66.1 62.3 9.8 5.7
1995 34.0 54.4 59.0 29.4 24.5
1996 28.5 52.5 56.7 32.1 28.0
1998 28.2 54.1 43.8 40.0 46.7
Source) China Statistical Yearbook, various editions
Note) Non-pulic sector means all sectors other than state and collective ones.   20
 
 
Table. 2 SOE Efficiency and Profitability 
     Wage Share  (%)     Profit-Tax Ratio (%)     Average Wage (yuan)  Labor Productivity 
(10000 yuan) 
  1985    1995  1985    1995  1985    1995  1985    1995 
             
Total  25.14  33.10  35.06  15.64  1042 5,086 1.277  7.492 
State-owned 
Enterprises 
22.02  37.08  32.94  13.45  1164 5,546 1.598  6.739 
Collective-own
ed Enterprises 
34.84  33.15  46.96  22.26  863 3,811 0.799  6.170 
Private 
Industry 
  16.83    50.71  4,086   9.797 
Joint Industry  21.08  32.79  64.44  18.45  1051 5,491 1.681  9.196 
Share-holding Industry  26.22    25.63  6,891   12.482 
Foreign Founded 
Industry 
23.16  17.80  31.9  20.29  2138 7,590 4.693  19.548 
             
Culculated from Chinese Industrial Census, 1985, 1995     
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Table 3. Methods of appointing managers in enterprises in China (%)     
     State owned    Collectives  Foreign funded Share-holding 
Appointment by government  86.0  58.4 33.2  40.4   
Election by employees ’ 
meeting 
7.4  21.4 5.0  10.8   
 but with government approval           
Through auction    2.2  3.1 1.5  3.0   
Appointment by managerial 
board 
2.5  14.0 58.3  43.0   
Others      1.9  3.1 2.0  2.8   
Source)Zhongguo Qiyejia Diaocha Xitong, "Hongguan Gaige yu Qiye Fazhan (Macroeconomic 
Reform and Enterprise Development)" , Guanli Shijie (Management World), 1995 
No.1 
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Table 4. Development of Privatization in Selected European Transition Countries 
  1990  1991  1992  1993 1994  1995  1996  1997 
Private Sector Share of GDP (%)                
Russia        50.0  55.0  60.0  70 
Ukraine        30 30.0  40.5  35.0  50 
Poland    45.3   48.2   53.5 56.0  60.0  60.0   
Hungary    33  44  52.4 55.0  60.0  70.0  75 
Romania   16.4  23.6   26.4  34.8 38.9  45.0  52.0  58 
Czech   12.3  17.3   27.7   45.1 56.3  66.4  75.4   
Slovenia    15.7   19.5   30.0  45.0  45.0  50 
               
Private Sector Share of Employment (%)             
Russia  12.5  13.3   18.3   28.1 33.0  34.4  35.0   
Ukraine      24.1   23.7 27.7  26.9  48.1  52 
Poland  48.9  56.6   58.8   62.2 64.9  66.8  72.3   
Hungary  ( in Non-Financial Sector)    40.8   53.8  54.7     
Romania         46.3 51.3  52.6  53.8  54.2 
Czech   19.3  28.7   38.9   59.3 63.7  74.9  76.9   
Slovenia    12.1   15.9   18.7 22.4  37.5     
Source)  Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization Database, ECSPF and DECRG    23
 
Table. 5 Correlations of profit/revenueratio with share strucrure in listed companies by industry 
    Profit-revenue ratio    Profit-revenue ratio    Profit-revenue ratio   
Category (number of samples)   number of samples  with  with  with 
  with state shares  state share ratio  unlisted share ratio  dominant share ratio 
Manufacturing total (302)  (203)  0.1057  0.0364  0.1320 
Medicines (23)  (17)  0.4776  0.2475  0.2070 
Chemicals (49)  (42)  -0.0439  0.0646  -0.0735 
Machinery in general (93)  (54)  -0.1329  0.0979  0.1096 
  Transport Machinery (26)  (20)  -0.0792  0.2977  0.2454 
Metals (30)  (20)  -0.0994  0.0123  0.0293 
Textiles (31)  (18)  0.1199  0.0317  0.0088 
Energy (24)  (20)  0.1789  0.0490  0.1227 
Public Utilities (14)  (10)  -0.3527  0.1797  -0.0896 
Commerce (26)  (22)  0.2353  -0.0974  0.2843 
Notes) Listed companies on the Shenzhen stock market only. Dominant share ratio means  
a proportion of the largest marketed shares.     
Source) Lin, Yixiang (ed,), '2000 Shangshi Gonsi Fenxi (Analysis of Listed Corporations 2000),   
Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chupanshe, 2000         24
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